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O
ne of the alleged justifications for government provision of roads is that the 
power of eminent domain is necessary in order to overcome holdout prob-
lems and obtain right-of-way properties (Goldstein 1987).1 After all, this 
argument continues, only the state has such power, so the private sector would be 
unable to supply the efficient amount of roads.2 In this article, I examine this mar-
ket-failure justification for public roads from three different perspectives and demon-
Bruce L. Benson is DeVoe Moore Distinguished Research Professor in the Department of Economics at 
Florida State University.
1. In the United States, the power to force a private-property holder to sell property to a government entity 
(federal, state, or local government agency) is called eminent domain, but this term is not widely used or 
recognized in other parts of the world. The more general term is compulsory sale.
2. There are other alleged justifications for public roads as well. Perhaps the primary one, at least from 
a theoretical perspective, is the public-good/free-rider argument, which implies that coercive taxation is 
needed to pay for roads and therefore that the private sector cannot provide an efficient supply of roads. 
I have rejected this argument elsewhere (Benson 1994). Indeed, private provision of roads is common. 
Also see Roth (1996, 196–207) for discussion of fallacies in other objections to privately provided roads 
(justifications for public roads).
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strate that it is not valid.3 The first and perhaps the most obvious point regarding the   
eminent-domain justification for government provision of roads is that even if this power 
is required to obtain a right-of-way, the government does not have to site, construct, 
finance, or operate (that is, maintain and police) the road. I briefly summarize some of 
substantial historical and modern evidence that members of the private sector are able 
and, indeed, willing to site, construct, finance, and operate roads if they are allowed to 
do so. The implication is that even if eminent domain is required in order to obtain a 
right-of-way, that right-of-way can be turned over to the private sector, which can then 
build and operate the road.
I turn next to a direct examination of the alleged market-imperfection justifica-
tion for the use of eminent domain to obtain right-of-way properties: transactions costs 
owing to the “holdout” problem that is assumed to prevent private-sector acquisitions 
of multiple contiguous land parcels for a roadway (Fischel 1995, 68–70). I demonstrate 
that the holdout problem is not nearly as severe as it is assumed to be when private 
entities make the purchase. Although government entities may face a significant hold-
out problem, the magnitude of any market failure that might occur with a private road 
system is much less significant than this holdout justification for public roads assumes. 
Finally, I explain that the use of eminent domain is undesirable for a number of gov-
ernment-failure reasons. Therefore, even if a potential market failure limits private road 
providers’ ability to obtain right-of-way properties, the “need” for eminent domain does 
not justify public provision of roads. Eminent domain is not even justified for the private 
provision of roads because the probability of market failure is low in the absence of this 
power and because the substantial degree of government failure that accompanies the 
power appears to overwhelm any benefit from overcoming the holdout problem.
Must the State Own, Build, or Operate Roads?
Putting aside for a moment the issue of eminent domain, let us consider whether the 
state must own, build, or operate roads.4 Numerous examples of privately provided 
3. Although a substantial literature exists on such “takings,” most of it does not question the validity of 
government’s power of eminent domain. Instead, the literature focuses on three issues that arise given that 
the government has such power: (1) what constitutes a legitimate public purpose (an issue I discuss later); 
(2) what constitutes a property taking (that is, where is the boundary between police powers and the power 
of eminent domain?), considering that eminent domain requires compensation, whereas police powers 
do not; and (3) what factors should be considered in determining “fair” compensation. As Paul suggests, 
however, these issues are secondary to a more fundamental question: Is the power of eminent domain (or 
police powers in general) justifiable (1988, 5–6)?
4. After all, “government failure” in transportation policy is quite apparent (Winston 2000). Simply examine 
the level of traffic congestion in most urban areas of the United States, the United Kingdom, and many other 
parts of the world (for example, in Seoul, South Korea). Winston points out that although transportation 
“experts” advocate more “efficient” polices, such as congestion charges, it is “futile to expect public offi-
cials to consider such changes because urban transportation policy is largely shaped by entrenched political 
forces. The forces that have led to inefficient prices and services, excessive labor costs, bloated bureaucracies, VOLUME X, NUMBER 2, FALL 2005
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roads from highways to local roads in the United States and other countries, both at 
the present time and in the past, indicate that it evidently need not. In addition to the 
chapters in the forthcoming Roth volume on Sweden’s extensive private road sys-
tem, recent privately built and run highways in the United States, the many privately 
built and maintained local roads, the history of privately built roads in Great Britain 
and in the United States, and the privatization of road management, Beito (2002) 
and Newman (1980) discuss the history and recent past of privately provided roads 
in St. Louis. Shearing and Stenning (1987) detail the massive role of private security 
and the resulting order in Disney World, a huge complex with hundreds of miles of 
private roads and highways (also see Foldvary 1994). Furthermore, many develop-
ing countries are franchising roads to private firms that construct the roads and then 
operate them, charging tolls to earn the costs of construction and operation, and 
to cover franchising fees paid to the government (Pereyra 2002). Indeed, provid-
ing such roads is so attractive, in part because of their impact on real-estate values, 
that it is becoming increasingly common for governments to auction franchises 
(Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic 2002). Roth also documents several private road 
projects in developing and developed countries, such as two recent private highways 
in Great Britain (the Dartford River Crossing Ltd.’s toll bridge crossing the Thames 
and Midland Expressway Ltd.’s M6-Toll Road, a twenty-seven mile expressway to 
relieve congestion in one of England’s busiest urban areas) (forthcoming and 1996, 
180–97). The United States also has begun to develop and even encourage private 
highway projects. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) 
of 1991 attempts to stimulate privately provided toll roads, bridges, and tunnels 
in the United States (as long as they are not part of the interstate highway system) 
by making them eligible for a 50 percent grant from the Highway Trust Fund, 
and in an effort to take advantage of these available funds a number of states have 
passed their own legislation to allow private provision of roads (private providers of 
roads have been reluctant to accept such funding, however, choosing to seek private 
financing instead because of the added costs and delays that arise when the federal 
government becomes involved).
Private entities can and do finance, build, and operate roads, and they would 
do so much more often if they could retain profits. Thus, even if eminent domain is 
necessary in order to obtain right-of-way properties (and for many of the roads, espe-
cially local roads, it is clearly not necessary), the state can purchase and then transfer 
the land to private entities. Are eminent-domain powers necessary, however, to obtain 
property for a major road’s right-of-way?
and construction-cost overruns promise more of the same in the future. The only realistic way to improve 
the system is to shield it from those influences and expose it to market forces by privatizing it. Preliminary 
evidence for the United Kingdom and elsewhere suggests that although a private urban transportation sector 
should not be expected to perform flawlessly, it could eliminate most government failures and allow innova-
tion and state-of-the-art technology to flourish free of government interference” (2000, 2).THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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Do Holdouts Justify Eminent Domain?
Resources, such as land for a right-of-way, can be acquired through compulsory sale, 
but for efficiency’s sake voluntary exchange is clearly more desirable if it is possible. To 
see why, suppose one person, individual A, wants to obtain possession of a tract of land 
that is currently legally controlled by another person, individual B. There are two ways 
for A to obtain the property: through bargaining in an effort to achieve a mutually 
advantageous exchange or through coercion if A has the power to force a transfer or 
the ability to call on someone (for example, the legislature) who has such power. The 
bargaining option is considered here; the alternative is discussed later. Suppose that A 
values the land at $500,000, and B values it at $300,000. A and B are then likely to find 
mutually advantageous terms to make the exchange. At a price of $420,000, for exam-
ple, both can conclude the exchange pleased by the deal they brokered. A fundamental 
if common fact is that voluntary exchange takes place only when both parties expect to 
be better off as a consequence. Voluntary exchanges occur because both parties trade 
something they value less for something they value more. Therefore, if a successful vol-
untary exchange takes place, the traded good will be allocated to a higher valued use.5 Of 
course, some readers may not find normatively attractive the goal of allocating things to 
their highest-valued use according to individuals’ subjective value. Note, however, that 
voluntary exchange makes both parties to the exchange better off: voluntary exchange 
increases wealth (subjective well-being) in what economists refer to as a Pareto optimal 
way. Pareto optimality denotes a condition in which all actions that make someone bet-
ter off without making anyone else worse off have been taken. In general, voluntary 
exchange achieves this outcome.6 Pareto optimality is not the end of welfare analysis, 
but it is an important component that virtually everyone finds desirable.
Holdout Problems and Involuntary Transfers
Because exchange is not costless, some mutually beneficial exchanges never take place. 
In theory, then, a substitute for bargaining, such as regulation or compulsory sale 
through eminent domain, may increase social welfare. In this context, Calabresi and 
Melamed (1972) point out that an entitlement (the right to use an asset or resource) 
can be “protected” (that is, supported by the legal system) in three different ways: by a 
“property rule,” by a “liability rule,” or by “inalienability.” An entitlement is protected 
by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement 
5. Of course, someone else may value the land even more, but if so, that person should bid more for it. 
Competitive bidding should lead to exchanges that result in assets being allocated to their highest valued use 
unless something prevents such an exchange (an issue addressed later). This outcome is clearly one reason 
to encourage both voluntary exchange and competition to engage in exchanges.
6. Naturally, fraud can lead to non-Pareto-improving exchanges, so trust or recourse (for example, to a 
legal system) is required to alleviate this problem when significant asymmetries in information exist (Ben-
son 2001). Problems may also arise if the exchange gives rise to significant nonpecuniary externalities.VOLUME X, NUMBER 2, FALL 2005
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from its holder must obtain the current entitlement holder’s permission before the trans-
fer (for example, in a voluntary exchange). When an entitlement can be taken without 
prior permission by someone who pays objectively determined compensation after the 
fact, the entitlement is protected by a liability rule. The government’s power of eminent 
domain exemplifies a liability rule.7 Of course, after the entitlement has been taken, the 
previous holder has an incentive to claim that a high price would have been required 
to induce him to sell, and the taker has incentive to claim the opposite, so a court will 
often have to determine liability based on evidence other than the statements of the 
parties involved.
In an efficiency perspective, entitlements should be protected by a property rule 
when bargaining is possible because only the parties directly involved know their 
subjective values, which are likely to be revealed only through voluntary bargaining. 
It is often claimed, however, as Posner (1977, 10–12, 51) and Kraus (2000, 788) 
explain, that when transactions costs are so high that bargaining is not likely to occur, 
a liability rule is preferred (see also Barnes and Stout 1992, 56; Fischel 1995, 67–70). 
Both Kraus (2000, 788–90) and Posner (1977, 39–44) emphasize, however, that this 
argument has significant problems (see also, for example, Polinsky 1980, 1111; Krier 
and Schwab 1995, 45). One reason for questioning this widely held conclusion is the 
often implicit assumption that whereas transactions costs are high for private parties, 
information costs are low for judges or juries who must determine compensation 
(Polinsky 1980). As Kraus notes, if “both transactions costs and judicial assessment 
costs are high, there is little reason to believe that protecting an entitlement with a 
liability rule will be particularly conducive to efficiency” (2000, 788). Kraus goes on 
to explain that we have many reasons to expect that the assessment of compensation 
will be incorrect. The undervaluation bias (discussed later) indicates that his argument 
often applies to eminent-domain transfers.
The primary source of transactions costs that allegedly justify eminent domain for 
right-of-way properties is the so-called holdout problem (Posner 1977, 40–41; Fischel 
1995, 68; Miceli and Segerson 2000, 3: 330). Posner succinctly explains this problem:
An economic reason for eminent domain, although one applicable to its use 
by railroads and other right-of-way companies rather than by government, 
is that it is necessary to prevent monopoly. Once the railroad or pipeline 
[or highway] has begun to build its line, the cost of abandoning it for an 
alternative route becomes very high. Knowing this, people owning land in 
the path of the advancing line will be tempted to hold out for a very high 
price—a price in excess of the actual opportunity cost of the land. The high 
cost of acquiring land will, by increasing the costs of right-of-way compa-
nies, induce them to raise the prices of their services; the higher prices will 
7. An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted at all, even from a willing 
seller to a willing buyer. In other words, the asset is not truly private property. The holder has use rights 
but no right to alienate those use rights.THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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induce some consumers to shift to substitute services; the companies will 
therefore have a smaller output; and as a result the companies will need, and 
will purchase, less land than they would have purchased at prices equal to 
(or slightly above) the opportunity costs of the land. Furthermore, higher 
land prices will give the companies an incentive to substitute other inputs 
for some of the land that they would ordinarily purchase. As a result of 
these factors land that would have been more valuable to the right-of-way 
company than to its present owners remain in its existing, less valuable uses, 
and this is inefficient. (1977, 40–41)
Indeed, a holdout problem can be so severe that it prevents the transfers of any 
property for a right-of-way. If land must be obtained from a large number of land 
owners who know about the intended purchase ahead of time, they all will want to 
be the last individual to sell in order to be in a monopoly position and extract the 
highest possible price. Such strategic behavior by sellers means that the private buyer 
may expect the transactions costs to be so high that he gives up the effort, and the 
road is never built. Thus, Fischel suggests that “Preventing time-consuming strategic 
bargaining is an important justification for eminent domain” (1995, 68).
Holdout incentives for sellers actually may be weaker than they are often assumed 
to be, however, especially if an individual sells only part of his land for a road right-of-
way. After all, the increase in the rental value of his remaining land because of its prox-
imity and access to the road can easily be substantially greater than the value of the land 
that is sold for right-of-way (consider the amount of land that housing developers often 
set aside for roads, which they also build, because good roads dramatically raise the 
value of the lots in the development). Thus, many landowners have a strong incentive 
to sell part of their land, and that incentive can offset the incentive to hold out (Engel, 
Fischer, and Galetovic 2002). In fact, history demonstrates that many landowners have 
voluntarily donated land for private-sector highway rights-of-way for precisely this rea-
son (Klein 1990). Private developers also frequently donate land to the state so that it 
can build roads that connect their developments to public highways.
Note further that Posner’s description of the holdout problem explicitly assumes 
that only one right-of-way exists and that the project begins before all of the land for 
the right-of-way has been purchased. These two assumptions lead to the potential for 
a single seller to act as a monopolist because the buyer has no available alternative. If 
this situation is not the case, then, once again, holdouts may not be a serious concern, 
as Posner (1977, 43–43) observes. In this regard, for instance, Miceli and Segerson 
note that, in theory, the land can be acquired prior to construction (2000, 330). They 
recognize, however, that when projects are publicly funded, plans are not likely to be 
kept secret until after the land has been obtained because of the need to appropriate 
the funds (and, we might add, because of the prevalence of corruption as public offi-
cials sell information to speculators). They also note, though, that private developers 
who want to assemble large tracts of land do not have the power of eminent domain VOLUME X, NUMBER 2, FALL 2005
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(except through manipulation of the political process), perhaps because it is “easier 
for them to acquire the property while disguising their ultimate intent, for example, 
through the use of ‘dummy’ buyers” (2000, 330). In other words, although Posner 
explicitly recognizes that the economic justification for eminent domain based on the 
holdout problem actually is “applicable” to private purchasers of right-of-way “rather 
than [to] the government” (1977, 41), private-sector purchasers of right-of-way are 
actually much more likely to avoid the problem than the government is.
Private buyers of multiple parcels can also make their deals much more quickly 
than public buyers. They do not have to get budgets approved by legislatures, deal 
with time-delaying statutory procedures, or operate under rules that limit the amount 
that they can pay for each piece of land (for example, rules that constrain bureaucrats 
to pay no more than the assessed values). Therefore, the likelihood that a private 
firm’s plans will be discovered is much less than that a government agency’s similar 
plans will be. Not surprisingly, private developers frequently consolidate large parcels 
of land without being held up (Starkie 1990).
A private buyer’s secret efforts to obtain a right-of-way may be discovered, of 
course, and, if they are, holdout incentives may arise. Can such transactions costs be 
avoided? Landsburg (1993) provides an interesting solution to what might initially 
appear to be an intractable problem analogous to the holdout problem, citing a situa-
tion from Joseph Conrad’s novel Typhoon. A number of sailors stored their gold coins 
in personal boxes in the ship’s safe, but a severe storm caused the boxes to break open 
and mixed all of the coins together. Everyone knew how many coins he had placed in 
the safe, but no one knew how many the others had placed there. Therefore, everyone 
had an incentive to claim that he had put more coins in the safe than he actually had, 
and the captain’s problem was to determine how to divide the coins to give each sailor 
his actual savings. Landsburg’s proposed solution: “Have each sailor write down the 
number of coins he is entitled to. Collect the papers and distribute the coins. [But] 
[a]nnounce in advance that if the numbers on the papers don’t add up to the cor-
rect total, you will throw all of the coins overboard” (1993, 29). This scheme clearly 
reduces and perhaps eliminates the incentive to hold out for more coins than the men 
had actually contributed.
A similar strategy might be used by the private buyer of a right-of-way even if it 
is known that a highway is going to be constructed. Suppose, for example, that the 
highway provider chooses more than one potential route. He then informs the land 
owners along the two routes that he would like to purchase specified parcels from 
each of them and that each should submit the price at which he is willing to sell (alter-
natively the developer might make initial bids that can be accepted, but indicate that 
each seller has an opportunity to make one take-it-or-leave-it counteroffer). In addi-
tion, potential sellers are informed that the buyer will purchase only the right-of-way 
with the lower total cost (a maximum might also be specified or information provided 
about the total acreage required on each right-of-way). Pipeline builders, for example, 
although their precise strategies may differ, “routinely consider alternative routes, THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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negotiate with different groups of owners, and settle with the first group that comes 
up with an acceptable arrangement. Where buyers compete with competing groups 
of sellers, there is extra pressure on the sellers to agree to reasonable deals” (Roth 
1996, 199). When a private buyer structures the bargain appropriately (for example, 
by secretly buying land, or by simultaneously considering alternative routes and buy-
ing the parcels only after every seller has agreed and before the project starts, or by 
choosing routes where landowners give up only part of their land and expect to collect 
increased rent on the rest), holdouts are not likely to prevent right-of-way acquisi-
tion. Indeed, as Roth notes, the first two modern privately provided highways in the 
United States—the Dulles Greenway in Virginia and SR-91 in California—obtained 
the land they required from private landowners without relying on eminent domain, 
choosing instead to bargain (some properties were in existing public roadway corri-
dors, which had to be obtained from governments) (1996, 199).
Fischel, in criticizing arguments against the use of eminent domain, notes that 
the literature has not indicated how the holdout problem is to be dealt with, and he 
suggests that the theoretical progress made regarding methods to induce people to 
reveal their preferences involve complicated voting rules (1995, 70). Similarly, Laz-
zarotti contends that “without eminent domain, it would be virtually impossible to 
fathom an alternative means of establishing such a complex network of transporta-
tion as exists in this country” (1999, 49). However, these arguments either presume 
that roads are provided by the government or that private entities will face the same 
holdout problems that government does. One reason for analysts’ failure to indicate 
how to resolve the holdout problem in right-of-way procurement is that they have 
not given sufficient consideration to the possibility of privatized road systems. Theo-
rists (as well as observers such as Fischel and Lazzarotti) presume that the govern-
ment will provide roads and obtain right-of-way properties through eminent domain 
if the holdout problem prevents voluntary purchase, so there is no problem to resolve. 
However, if serious consideration were given to private road provision, potential solu-
tions might come forth quickly.
Consider the growing literature on combinatorial auctions (see De Vries and 
Vohra 2001 for a review). Among the issues considered in this literature is the struc-
ture of auctions employed to buy or sell simultaneously sets of assets that are comple-
mentary (or perhaps substitutable for other sets of assets). Such auctions allow buyers 
to submit bids on groups of assets and make the purchase of each asset conditional on 
the purchase of other, complementary assets (or perhaps conditional on the combined 
price being lower than that of a substitute bundle). Clearly, the parcels of land for a 
road right-of-way are complementary (and the parcels that compose another potential 
right-of-way may be substitutes for those in a particular right-of-way). Alternatively, 
sellers of a set of complementary assets might offer a combined bundle of such assets 
to potential buyers (for example, if a group of land owners wants to increase the rental 
value of their land, it might offer a right-of-way to toll-road developers). Such auctions 
are used in a number of areas, and several logistics-consulting firms have produced VOLUME X, NUMBER 2, FALL 2005
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software to implement complex combinatorial auctions. For example, several large 
firms (including Sears, Wal-Mart, Kmart, Ford Motor Company) use combinatorial 
auctions to select transportation carriers in order to construct routes that minimize 
costs by avoiding empty back hauls and other unnecessary costs. Actual market partic-
ipants have discovered many ways to induce people to reveal their relative preferences 
in situations similar to those that would characterize right-of-way purchase by private 
firms, and this really is the relevant issue, even if theorists do not fully understand how 
these processes might be refined to accumulate the parcels needed for highway routes. 
Indeed, the growing literature on combinatorial auctions is developing as theorists 
attempt to understand the processes already being implemented.
Government Failure Through Eminent Domain
In light of the preceding discussion, recall individual A introduced earlier who valued 
a parcel of land at $500,000. In the earlier hypothetical example, individual A tried to 
obtain control of the land through voluntary bargaining, but doing so is not his only 
option. Assume that by spending $50,000 (perhaps on a lobbyist, a bribe, or some 
other method of influencing the city council) he is sure he can get local government 
officials to decide that the business he is going to establish on the land is in the “pub-
lic interest” because it will generate employment in the community and increase the 
tax base (in my later discussion of the actual purposes of eminent-domain condemna-
tions, it becomes clear that this expectation would be an adequate justification for 
such political action). He negotiates with the local officials, who decide to condemn 
the land and sell it to him for $100,000—well below its market value—because they 
are convinced (or claim to be convinced) that the project will benefit the community. 
The city’s land appraiser determines that the “fair compensation” for the parcel is 
$250,000 (after all, the assessor cannot determine individual B’s actual subjective 
value of the land; furthermore, as explained later, an undervaluation bias prevails in 
such assessment processes), which is paid to B. In this case, the land is still transferred 
to a higher-valued use, but the transfer is not Pareto optimal because B and the tax-
payers who pay the $100,000 difference between the compensation payment and the 
sales price are worse off. Individual A is clearly much better off, and we know that he 
could fully compensate B and the taxpayers for their losses if he wanted to (his deci-
sion to choose condemnation rather than bargaining suggests that he is not willing 
to do so, however). Thus, the “net” gain in social welfare is as large as it was under 
voluntary exchange, but the gain is now distributed so unequally that the “transac-
tion” now makes some people worse off. In this light, note that some economists 
suggest that the Pareto criterion is too constraining in the public-policy arena and that 
an alternative, called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (the gainers gain enough to compensate 
the losers, even if no compensation is paid), is preferable. Recognize, however, that 
if full compensation is not required when a “Kaldor-Hicks efficient” transfer is made 
through the government, then the incentives to bargain in the first place are weak-THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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ened, as a subsidized political transfer is a more attractive option for the “buyer.” Why 
bargain and pay for a property that can be obtained without full payment through 
the use of political influence (unless the political influence is more expensive than 
the property would be)? Furthermore, whereas under voluntary exchange we know 
that the exchange makes both parties better off, no guarantee (not even in expecta-
tion) exists that under eminent domain land is moved to its highest-valued use. The 
example just given works just as well if B valued the land at $550,000, in which case 
any forced exchange would fail even the Kaldor-Hicks test and cause a reduction in 
net welfare.
Can inefficient transfers be avoided by constraining the use of eminent-domain 
powers to a limited set of circumstances? Suppose such purchases can be made only if 
the benefits to the “public” are clearly very large and sufficient compensation is paid 
to avoid making individuals worse off when their property is condemned, thus meet-
ing the Pareto criterion.
The U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment states, in part, “nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation” (emphasis added). Thus, it 
appears that the U.S. government’s eminent-domain powers are constrained to “pub-
lic-use” purposes (presumably uses with substantial benefits for many members of the 
public at large, as opposed to narrowly focused private uses) and that such takings 
must involve “just compensation.” Because this constitution is one of the most widely 
emulated in the world and perhaps one of the most successful at constraining govern-
ment action over a substantial period of time, let us consider the effectiveness of these 
constraints on transfer activity. After all, it would be surprising to find in many other 
countries constitutional constraints on compulsory sale that are stronger than those in 
the United States (indeed, in other parts of the world, weaker constraints on govern-
ment probably mean that compulsory sale is not used because arbitrary, uncompensated 
takings occur instead). First, let us consider how U.S. courts have interpreted public use, 
to see if they have prevented compulsory sale for purposes that produce relatively small, 
concentrated benefits. Thereafter we can consider the “justness” of compensation.8
8. Other constitutional constraints were also created. For example, the clauses in Article 1 of the U.S. 
Constitution (one of the sections from which the power of eminent domain is inferred) appear to limit 
federal takings by requiring the “Consent of the Legislature of the State” in which the property is located. 
This constraint probably raised the cost of federal seizures somewhat (the states faced no such constraint, 
however) and limited their use for several decades until the Supreme Court eliminated the constraint in 
Kohl v. United States (91 U.S. 367 [1875]), wherein the federal government was determined to have 
the power to take property directly in its own name. Prior to this case (which arose because Congress 
authorized the secretary of the Treasury to acquire land in Cincinnati for a public building, and federal 
officials condemned the land directly rather than obtaining it through state condemnation or voluntary 
exchange), the federal government had condemned land only through the intermediary of the state gov-
ernment. As Paul explains, however, “Justice Strong deduced a federal power to condemn in its own 
name both from the very nature of sovereignty and, more concretely, from the Fifth Amendment’s taking 
clause… . The latter inference was, undoubtedly, inventive. The requirement that the government must 
pay compensation when it takes was construed to imply a power to take in the first place. This clause, as 
virtually all commentators agree, is a restriction on government’s powers, not a concession” (1988, 73).VOLUME X, NUMBER 2, FALL 2005
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The Disappearance of the “Public-Use” Constraint
James Madison, who wrote the Fifth Amendment, and those who supported him 
clearly hoped to restrict takings of the sort that had occurred in the colonies under 
British  rule.9  Therefore,  besides  stipulating  just  compensation,  the  amendment 
explicitly requires that takings be for public use rather than for public purpose, interest, 
benefit, or some other term. Public use was recognized at the time as a narrower and 
more objective requirement than such alternative terms might imply (Jones 2000, 
290). Indeed, this wording was understood at the time as a strong constraint because 
the Framers did not recognize a nonpublic authority in government; “an express pro-
hibition on ‘private’ taking would [therefore] have been superfluous” (Jones 2000, 
289 n. 23).
Before 1875, all eminent-domain condemnations in the United States were per-
formed by state or local governments, and therefore most early litigation over the 
constitutional limits implied by “public use” took place in state courts.10 Evidence 
from this litigation illustrates that even though state constitutions had takings clauses 
similar to the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, two interpretations of the term 
public use were made in the states. The narrow interpretation required that the proj-
ect for which the condemned property was used had to be open to the public (Jones 
2000, 293), whereas the broader interpretation “equated public use with more nebu-
lous terms such as public advantage, public purpose, public benefit, or public welfare” 
(Paul 1988, 93). States adopting this broader interpretation allowed transfers of con-
demned land to private commercial activities under the assumption that “the public” 
benefited from economic development (Jones 2000, 292). Thus, many states used 
eminent-domain powers to transfer property from one private entity to another for a 
Today the eminent-domain power is generally assumed to be implied by such clauses as 7 and 17 of 
Article 1, Section 8, which give Congress the authority to establish post offices and post roads, and author-
ity over property purchased for forts, arsenals, and other such facilities, as well as by the taking clause of the 
Fifth Amendment quoted earlier (Paul 1988, 73). In this context, however, note that one of the arguments 
Alexander Hamilton raised against including the Bill of Rights in the Constitution was that “it would con-
tain various exceptions to power which are not granted” (Federalist No. 84). Indeed, some of the Founding 
Fathers argued for an explicit recognition of private-property rights that could not be taken by the govern-
ment. For example, Thomas Jefferson contended that all remnants of feudalism in regard to property should 
be eliminated. The feudal underpinnings of the common law of property, including the law of compulsory 
sale, were transplanted to the American colonies from Great Britain. Under feudalism, private individuals 
might “own” land, but they did so at the discretion of the king, essentially acting as stewards of the land, 
because the king (and later Parliament) could dispossess them if he chose to do so (Benson 2002), although 
it was also customary to compensate the landowners for the condemned property. Jefferson vigorously 
pushed for allodial ownership, wherein landowners would hold absolute dominion over their property. In 
other words, he contended that landholders should not be treated as stewards, with property ultimately 
allocated of the government’s prerogative (Paul 1988, 9). He feared that if the government were considered 
to be the ultimate owner of land, freedom could not be secure because the state would be in a position to 
reduce men to poverty or even serfdom. Other Founders obviously had a different view.
9. This subsection draws heavily from Paul 1988, Jones 2000, and Kulick 2000. For similar analysis and 
conclusions regarding the public-use issue and police powers, see Epstein 1985, 161–81.
10. See note 8 for an indication of why this practice obtained even for compulsory purchases of properties 
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variety of private purposes. In other states, however, the courts interpreted public use 
to mean “use by the public” (Paul 1988, 93).
When the U.S. Supreme Court began to consider eminent-domain issues, it 
adopted the narrow view of public use (Jones 2000, 292). In Kohl v. United States 
(91 U.S. 367 [1875]), for example, the Court explicitly stated that this power can be 
used by “a sovereign to take private property for its own public use, and not for those 
of another” (at 373–74). Furthermore, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska 
(164 U.S. 403 [1896]), ruling on a condemnation of railroad property by the state of 
Nebraska in order to transfer it to a private grain elevator, the Court concluded that 
the taking was an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, as well as being “in essence and effect, a taking of private prop-
erty [for a] private use.”11 Two decades later, however, the Court reversed itself. The 
opinion in Mount Vernon–Woodberry Cotton Duck C. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co. 
(240 U.S. 30 [1916]) explained that the Court would exercise great deference when 
reviewing a state court’s findings regarding public use, and in Old Dominion Land Co. 
v. United States (269 U.S. 55 [1929]) the Court began to suggest that it would exer-
cise similar deference with regard to legislative decisions about public use. Indeed, a 
relatively broad definition was explicitly adopted in Rindge C. v. Los Angeles County 
(262 U.S. 700, 707 [1923]): “It is not essential that the entire community, nor even 
any considerable portion, should directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in 
order to constitute a public use.”
United States ex. re. TVA v. Welch (327 U.S. 546 [1946]) came close to with-
drawing the federal court from even considering the question of public use when 
Justice Black wrote, “We think it is the function of Congress to decide what type of 
taking is for a public use and that the agency authorized to do the taking may do so to 
the full extent of its statutory authority” (at 551–52). Whatever limitation might have 
remained was severely undermined by Justice Douglas’s decision in Berman v. Parker 
(348 U.S. 26 [1954]). The case involved a District of Columbia condemnation of 
land in areas of the city apparently dominated by slums, with the land subsequently 
transferred to private developers. The plaintiff owned a department store in one of 
the areas, and, among other things, he objected to the fact that the seized property 
could be transferred to another private party who would then redevelop it and sell 
it for private gain. Douglas wrote, “The concept of the public welfare is broad and 
inclusive. . . . It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community 
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well 
11. Such rulings were consistent with earlier Supreme Court views of constitutional constraints. For exam-
ple, in Calder v. Bull (3 U.S. 386, 388 [1798]) the Court stated that there “are acts which the Federal or 
State Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free 
Republican Governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative 
power… . [For example, a] law that punishes a citizen for innocent action … a law that destroys, or impairs, 
the lawful private contracts of citizens, … or a law that takes property from A and gives it to B: it is against all 
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as carefully patrolled. . . . [T]here is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the 
way” (at 33). Paul describes the implications of Berman v. Parker as follows:
In a decision remarkable for its confusion of the central issues, Douglas and 
his colleagues concluded that the appellants’ “innocuous and unoffending” 
property could be taken for the larger “public purpose” of remediating 
urban blight. . . . [T]raditionally the limitation on the exercise of the police 
power, the power of the states to regulate property, has been something 
called the “public purpose.” This broad phrase allows quite a wide range 
of state regulatory behavior . . . so long as they serve some loosely defined 
notion of the public purpose. . . . What Douglas accomplished by his con-
fusion of the more permissive criterion of the police power’s public pur-
pose with eminent domain in Berman v. Parker was the application of the 
more permissive criterion of the police power’s public purpose to eminent 
domain. Public use as a constraint on governmental seizures suffered a crip-
pling blow as the result of Douglas’s confusion.
. . . If the legislature is “well nigh” the final arbiter of “public needs,” 
then what is the purpose of the Bill of Rights or the Constitution? The 
Court apparently lost sight of the purposes behind the Fifth Amendment’s 
property clauses: to limit congressional seizures of property; to place condi-
tions on those seizures that are necessary for a “public use,” and to protect 
individual property rights. (1988, 94).
Similarly, Epstein suggests that the public-use constraint suffered “a mortal blow 
in Berman v. Parker when [the Court] noted that ‘the concept of the public welfare 
is broad and inclusive’ enough to allow the use of the eminent domain power to 
achieve any end otherwise within the authority of Congress” (1985, 161). The deci-
sion essentially implies that whatever the legislature says is a public purpose (which 
now is the meaning of public use) is a public purpose, which “opened a Pandora’s Box 
of state interference with individual property rights” (Jones 2000, 294). If this deci-
sion did not completely eliminate the public-use constraint, then subsequent deci-
sions probably have.
12. Some state courts continued to employ a stricter public-use interpretation, however—at least for a 
while. See, for example, Baycol. v. Downtown Development Authority (315 So.2d 451 [Fla. 1975]) and In 
re City of Seattle (638 P.2d 549 [1981]).
13. For example, see People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley (368 N.E. 2d 915 [1977]), from Illinois, recog-
nizing the stimulation of economic growth as a valid public purpose; Courtesy Sandwich Shop Inc. v. Port of 
New York Authority (190 N.E. 2d 402, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 [1963]), regarding the condemna-
tion of property in order to build the World Trade Center with its public purpose of increasing the flow of 
commerce; Sun Co. v. City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency (209 A.D.2d 34 [N.Y. App. Div. 1995]), approv-
ing a condemnation in order to make way for a shopping mall; NL Indus. v. Eisenman Chem. Co. (645 P.2d 
976 [Nev. 1982]), approving a taking to support an “important” industry for the region; Prince George’s 
County v. Collington Crossroads Inc. (339 A.2d 278 [Md. 1975]), where the economic benefits from a 
particular industrial development project were seen as a sufficient public purpose. See Berliner 2002 for 
discussion of some of the condemnations that have occurred during the past few years.THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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Kulick notes that the state courts have closely mirrored the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the public-use issue (2000, 654),12 and many of them, now uncon-
strained by the federal constitution’s takings clause, have obviously continued to 
see new kinds of private transfers as acceptable public uses.13 One dramatic case 
occurred when the city of Detroit condemned the entire residential community of 
Poletown in order to provide land for General Motors Corporation to build a new 
assembly plant. This condemnation displaced 3,438 residents. The city paid $62 
million dollars for the land and another $138 million for other costs, including 
improvements required by General Motors to establish the facility, for a total of 
$200 million in taxpayer outlays, and then the city resold the property to General 
Motors for $8 million. The residents of Poletown sued, arguing that the takings 
did not constitute a public use. The city countered that massive unemployment 
would occur if the plant were not built (General Motors had announced the closing 
of its Detroit Cadillac and Fisher plants, with some six thousand employees, but 
offered to build a new assembly plant if it could obtain a satisfactory 465-acre site 
in the city)—hence the alleged public-use justification for the transfer. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court agreed with the city, stating that “the legislature had deter-
mined that governmental action of the type contemplated here meets a public need 
and serves an essential public purpose. The Court’s role after such a determination 
is made is limited” (Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit [304 N.W. 
2d 455 (1981)] at 458). Strongly worded dissenting opinions in Poletown suggest 
some of the consequences: Justice Fitzgerald explained that “the decision that the 
prospect of increased employment, tax revenue, and general economic stimulation 
makes a taking of private property for transfer to another private party sufficiently 
‘public’ to authorize the use of the power of compulsory purchase means that there 
is virtually no limit to the use of condemnation to aid private businesses” (at 644); 
and Justice Ryan recognized that the majority had “seriously jeopardized the secu-
rity of all private property ownership” (at 465). Yet Poletown may involve a more 
“public” use than some cases.
Jones notes that “in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the United States 
Supreme Court dealt the public use requirement a final mortal wound.” (2000, 
296–97). Hawaii passed the Land Reform Act, which transferred property from 
private-land owners to the lessees of that land. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals (Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff [702 F.2d. at 798]) declared the act 
to be “a naked attempt on the part of the state to take land from A and give it to B 
solely for B’s private use and benefit,” the Supreme Court declared the act consti-
14. Since Midkiff, the Supreme Court has reconfirmed the same public-use standard (or perhaps nonstan-
dard would be more appropriate). See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp. (503 U.S. 
407, 422 [1992]) and Susette Kelo, et. al., Petitioners v. City of New London, Connecticut, et al. (545 U.S. 
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tutional (Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff [476 U.S. 229 (1984)]). The Court 
ruled once again that if a legislature has determined that an eminent-domain taking 
involves “a conceivable public purpose,” then the public-use requirement has been 
met. As Kulick explains, “a legislature, under the Supreme Court’s guidance from 
15. Indeed, not even the supposed freedom-of-religion constraint on government prevents compulsory 
sale. Cypress, California, condemned land belonging to the Cottonwood Christian Center on May 28, 
2002, in order to provide it to Costco for a retail center (Austin 2002). Similarly, in New Cassel, New York, 
the North Hempstead Community Development Agency seized land owned by St. Luke’s Pentecostal 
Church and to be used to construct a new church (Berliner 2002). The land was condemned in order to 
provide it to a private retail developer (the condemnation decision was actually made in 1994, before the 
church purchased the property, but neither the church nor the previous owner had been informed of the 
decision to transfer the land).
16. Some have suggested that the public-use requirement is now being strengthened, noting, for example, 
the New Jersey Superior Court’s ruling in 1998 that the Casino Redevelopment Authority’s condemnation 
of a residence and its transfer to the Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino was not legal (Casino Redevelopment 
Authority v. Banin, 727 A. 2d 102 [N.J. Sup. Ct Law Div. 1998]), and this decision’s citation by some as 
a more “rational basis for review with a bite” (Kulick 2000, 661); also see Mansnerus 2001 and Starkman 
2001 for popular press reports of change. The alleged purpose of the transfer was to build a parking area 
and lawn (“green space,” according to the documents) for the Trump casino, and this, along with the 
“alleviation of traffic congestion,” was sufficient justification for “a conclusion that the primary purpose … 
is a public one.” However, no contractual restriction guaranteed that the land would be used for the stated 
purpose. The implication of the ruling was that the authority and Trump had to start over and include 
restrictions in the transferred deed that would prevent Trump from changing the use of the property, at 
least for a reasonable period of time, after the property had been transferred. I discuss this case in more 
detail later. A Connecticut state judge struck down the condemnation of eleven homes in New London for 
a similar reason--the authority that had condemned the property was not sufficiently explicit in stating what 
it was going to do with the land (Starkman 2002). The U.S. Supreme Court later upheld this condemna-
tion, however in Kelo v. New London.
The Mississippi Development Authority’s condemnation of thirty acres of residential property for a park-
ing lot to be part of a fourteen-hundred-acre Nissan plant project has been challenged, and the Mississippi 
Supreme Court issued a stay blocking the condemnation in May 2001 (Starkman 2001). Again, the court 
did not rule against the alleged public purpose, finding instead that the Development Authority may have 
taken more land than it needed to in order to meet the public use. This was actually a small part of a large 
financial deal with Nissan that included more than $300 million in subsidies and tax breaks along with a 
pledge by the Development Authority to “quick-take” the property in question so Nissan could build a 
parking lot near the factory, but the executive director of the Development Authority admitted that it did 
not actually have to seize the land in order to ensure that the factory would be built (Mississippi Churning 
2002).
Two recent state court cases also appear to be attempting to reinstate some form of public-use con-
straint. First, in June 2000, a California court blocked an eminent-domain condemnation that had pre-
viously been rescinded by the city of Lancaster, California (the plaintiff pursued the case even after 
the rescind order, fearing that the city might reverse itself again). This case, discussed by Starkman 
(2001), involved condemnation of space within a shopping center that was occupied by a “99 Cents 
Only Store” (one of a 110-store discount chain) in order to transfer it to a major competitor, Costco 
Wholesale Corporation. Costco was the mall’s anchor and had been in place about ten years, whereas 
99 Cents Only had moved into the mall in 1998. At that point, Costco told the city it needed to 
expand and demanded the 99 Cents Only Store’s space, threatening to move to a mall in a nearby 
town if it did not get the space. The city manager informed 99 Cents Only that it would have to 
move, and in June 2000 its site was condemned. The alleged public purpose was to avoid the “future 
blight” that would arise if Costco left. The court characterized the condemnation as “nothing more 
than the desire to achieve the naked transfer from one private party to another” and concluded that 
“Such conduct amounts to an unconstitutional taking purely for private purposes.” Of course, that 
does not matter under the Midkiff standard, and the city has announced that it will appeal, with the 
city attorney pointing out that “99 Cents produces less that $40,000 [per year] in sales taxes, and 
Costco was producing more than $400,000. You tell me which was more important.” That may well 
be a sufficient argument for a public purpose upon appeal. Similarly, Starkman (2002) explains that 
the Illinois Supreme Court just struck down the condemnation by the Southwestern Illinois Develop-
ment Authority (Southwestern Illinois Dev. Auth. v. National City Environmental [Ill. 2002]) of prop-
erty belonging to a metal-recycling plant in order to “reduce traffic congestion” by converting it intoTHE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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Midkiff, can legitimately effectuate public-private takings by merely making some 
legislative pronouncement that the taking will serve some public purpose or goal” 
(2000, 653).14 Clearly, no significant constitutional barriers remain to obstruct 
government condemnation of lands in the United States15 if the government can 
take land from landlords simply to transfer it to tenants.16
The demise of the public-use constraint is undesirable, as we can see from a num-
ber of perspectives, including those of efficiency, liberty, and equity (Epstein 1985, 
2001; Paul 1988; Jones 2000; Kulick 2000).17 My focus here is on economic effi-
ciency. One efficiency implication is that the lack of a public-use constraint increases 
the chance that the benefits of an involuntary transfer will be less than the costs, 
implying inefficiency even with the weak Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard (and clearly 
from a Pareto perspective), especially if the individuals who lose their property are 
undercompensated. It might be contended that although the demise of the public-
use constraint is problematic, the issue does not apply for privately provided roadways 
because transportation improvements clearly have significant public benefits, but even 
if this were the case, the point remains that the existence of a power of eminent domain 
to transfer property from one private enterprise to another has not been constrained 
to situations where the transfer clearly is efficient. Thus, in an efficiency perspective, 
the question of whether eminent domain to transfer property between private entities 
should be allowed for right-of-way acquisitions must be considered in the broader 
context: What is the net social benefit or cost of this power? After consideration of the 
“just compensation” constraint, I attempt to answer this question.
a parking lot for the Gateway International Raceway. The majority ruled that the condemnation’s primary 
purpose was to serve the private interests of the racetrack owners and that “Using the power of government 
for purely private purposes to allow Gateway to avoid the open real-estate market and expand its facilities in 
a more cost-efficient manner, thus maximizing corporate profits, is a misuse of the power entrusted by the 
public” (qtd. in Starkman 2002, 2). There was a lengthy dissent by two justices, however, contending that 
this was a proper public use, and the Southwestern Illinois Development Authority is seriously considering 
an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, it may be a while before this potential reinstatement of 
a public-use constraint can be counted on (and then it probably will hold only in Illinois), as indicated by 
Kelo v. New London.
17. This conclusion is far from universally accepted. For example, Fischel contends that the broad interpre-
tation of public use is desirable in part because he sees two other constraints on the use of eminent domain: 
the transactions costs of using it are high, so the “budget-preserving instincts of government agencies may 
usually be depended upon to limit eminent domain”; and uses of compulsory sale to transfer property for 
private uses “are also limited by popular revulsion at the government’s action” (1995, 74). The Constitu-
tion is supposed to protect people’s rights even without a “popular revulsion,” even when the majority sup-
ports some action that harms a minority, so it is supposed to be a stronger constraint than popular beliefs. 
Moreover, the budget-preserving tendency is not a relevant constraint when powerful political interests are 
seeking benefits through the political process, especially if the “fair compensation” constraint is also rela-
tively weak (in addition, revenues matter, as indicated in note 16). Finally, some bureaucracies have found 
ways to enhance their budgets through compulsory purchase. Recall the Southwestern Illinois Develop-
ment Authority’s seizure for Gateway International Raceway (note 16). Gateway used the Development 
Authority’s standard “application form” for seeking a condemnation for “private use” and paid the $2,500 
application fee. The authority also charged a percentage commission for the land: $56,500, a sum greater 
than the Development Authority’s appropriated budget (officials from the Development Authority also got 
free tickets to Gateway events) (Berliner 2002, 3).VOLUME X, NUMBER 2, FALL 2005
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The Systematic Undervaluation Bias under Eminent Domain
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires “just” compensation. The fed-
eral courts, however, did not constrain state or local compensation awards in eminent-
domain situations at all until the Fourteenth Amendment and its Due Process Clause 
were adopted. The Supreme Court previously had ruled that the Fifth Amendment’s 
Taking Clause applied only to the federal government (Baron v. Baltimore 7 Pet. 243, 
247 [U.S. 1833]).18 The Fourteenth Amendment states, in part: “nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law,” which implies that at 
least some legislative and bureaucratic actions may not meet constitutional standards. 
Therefore, in Chicago Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago (166 U. S. 
266 [1897]), the Supreme Court considered a claim that payment of just compensation 
for a takings was an essential ownership right, implying that any takings without such 
compensation was a violation of due process. The Supreme Court’s mere consideration 
of this issue might have been important because it implied that state-court decisions 
regarding compensation under eminent domain could be appealed to the federal level 
on due-process grounds, suggesting a potential constraint on compensation assessments. 
However, the potential constraint did not materialize. The Court ruled that its review 
of state-court rulings on matters of fact was improper (under the Seventh Amendment) 
and that the Illinois court’s conclusion that no significant property had been taken 
was an issue of fact, not one of law. The city of Chicago had opened a public street on 
the railroad’s land and compensated it with a payment of one dollar, contending that 
no significant property had been taken because the land’s railroad purposes were not 
impaired; ignoring the railroad’s erection of a gateway to make the street-crossing safe, 
the Court ruled that “such expenses must be regarded as incidental to the exercise of 
the police powers of the state.”
The Supreme Court has considered both federal and state (and local) eminent-
domain compensation cases since Chicago Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company 
v. Chicago in 1897, and it has shaped the law regarding just compensation, just as it 
has the public-use requirement. Note first that the concept of property (what really 
18. The only other eminent-domain case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court during the first decades of the 
country’s existence was West River Bridge v. Dix (6 How. 507 [U.S. 1848]), but that case was based on 
Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution, which bars states from impairing the obligation of contracts. 
This case is interesting in the context of privately provided roads because it involved a privately operated 
bridge. Vermont had granted an exclusive franchise to operate a bridge for one hundred years. The private 
firm was willing to operate the bridge, but the state decided to take it over anyway. West River Bridge sued, 
contending that the franchise charter was a contract, and even though the Supreme Court agreed that the 
charter was a contract, it ruled that the state’s breach and seizure of the bridge did not violate Article 1, 
Section 10. Instead, the Court stated that the state’s eminent-domain powers were “paramount to all pri-
vate rights vested under the government, and these last are by necessary implication, held in subordination 
to this power, and must yield in every instance to its proper exercise.” In other words, contracts, including 
contracts entered into by a state legislature, can be taken through eminent domain—“a rather odd conclu-
sion,” according to Paul, “one among many that served to eviscerate the contract clause, while strengthen-
ing the states’ power to take all kinds of interests in property” (1988, 78).THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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constitutes a taking) and the notion of just compensation are intertwined. Although 
compensation might be generous, if the definition of property is very narrow, so that 
most government actions that affect property uses and values are not considered to 
be significant takings (as in Chicago Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v. 
Chicago) or are treated as police-power actions that do not require compensation 
rather than as eminent-domain takings that do, then compensation will not be paid 
very often. In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of property appears to 
have broadened after 1897. Indeed, the Court has been explicit in some cases, stat-
ing, for example, that the meaning of property is not interpreted in the “vulgar and 
untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which citizens exercises rights 
recognized by law. . . . [Property refers to] the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s 
relation to the physical thing. . . . The constitutional provision is addressed to every 
sort of interest the citizen may possess” (United States v. General Motors 323 U.S. 
373, 377–78 [1945]).19
In Olson v. United States (292 U.S. 246 [1934]), the Court explained that com-
pensation should put an owner “in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had 
not been taken. He must be made whole but is not entitled to more. It is the property 
and not the cost of it that is safeguarded by the state and federal constitutions.” Epstein 
notes that this standard is an appropriate one in an economic perspective because the 
Pareto criterion is met (1985, 182). If compensation really comes close to making the 
loser whole, however, then one must wonder why a voluntary exchange did not occur, 
either between the state and the property owner or between two private parties. One 
obvious conclusion is that the compensation is actually less than what a willing seller 
would accept, as Epstein (1985) observes, because in reality courts do not follow this 
19. Some relatively recent Supreme Court decisions also appear to broaden the concept of property-rights 
takings that require at least some compensation (for example, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council), but 
the overall trend in such requirements is far from clear, especially given the decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preser-
vation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002). See Greenhouse 2002 and Paul 1988, 82–91.
20. A possibility considered earlier is that transactions costs prevent bargaining, but the answer suggested 
here is clearly relevant in many cases. After all, “abuses in practice are legion” (Paul 1988, 81). Further-
more, many loses are still considered to be “incidental,” as in Chicago Burlington and Quincy Railroad 
Company v. Chicago. In United States v. General Motors, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the loss of busi-
ness goodwill or other injury to a business is not recoverable. Other losses that the Court considers to be 
unrecoverable include future loss of profits and the expenses associated with removing fixtures or personal 
property from the condemned property (even though expenses for moving are supposedly recoverable). 
As Paul explains, “the Court reasoning that such losses would be the same as might ensue upon the sale of 
property to a private buyer … because when business persons sell their buildings … they have presumably 
factored in these ancillary costs and found the deals satisfactory despite such costs. No such assumption, of 
course, can be made where the government forcibly takes property … over the owner’s objection … and, 
indeed, the opposite assumption is far more likely” (1988, 165). The Court actually recognized this matter, 
however, when it stated that “no doubt all those elements would be considered by an owner in determin-
ing whether, and at what price, to sell. No doubt, therefore, if the owner is to be made whole for the loss 
consequent of the sovereigns’ seizure of his property, these elements should properly be considered. But 
the courts have generally held that they are not to be reckoned as part of the compensation for the fee taken 
by the government” (United States v. General Motors, at 379). In other words, in the past such property 
takings have not been compensated, so compensation is not required. As a result, loses arising in many 
condemnations are considered to be incidental owing to the interpretation of property, and therefore as not 
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standard.20 Instead, they have chosen to ignore subjective value in most cases. This prac-
tice stems from Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States (148 U.S. 312 [1893]), 
at 325–26), in which the Supreme Court recognized that one of the important reasons 
for awarding just compensation is that “it prevents the public from loading upon one 
individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he 
surrenders to the public something more and different from that which is exacted from 
other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.” Yet the 
Court went on to hedge this statement by stressing that “this just compensation, it will 
be noticed, is for the property, and not the owner” (at 326). This qualification has been 
interpreted to mean that the compensation is for the property taken and not for losses 
to the owner that are a consequence of that taking (Epstein 2001, 12). In other words, 
the landowner bears any losses that are collateral to or a result of the taking of property. 
In fact, although the Monongahela standard may imply that the person whose property 
is taken is entitled to be compensated for losses of subjective value, subsequent inter-
pretation has denied such an interpretation. In United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land 
(442 U.S. 506, 511 [1979]), the Court stated that “the owner is entitled to receive 
‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the time of the taking.”21 
However, as Epstein explains,
There is a good reason why “for sale” signs do not sprout from every front 
lawn in the Untied States. In a well ordered society most individuals are 
content with their personal living or business situation. They do not put 
their property up for sale because they do not think that there is any other 
person out there who is likely to value it for a sum greater than they do. In 
the normal case, use value is greater than exchange value, so the property is 
kept off the market. The use of the market value standard therefore results 
in a situation in which the party who owns the property, even if he shares in 
the social gain generated by the project, is still left worse off than his peers. 
He is forced to sacrifice the subjective values associated with his property, 
values which almost by definition he could not recreate through his next 
best use for the funds received. (2001, 12–13)
After all, owners purchase property because they value it at more than the purchase 
price, or they hold onto the property because they place more value on it than the 
market price they could get for it. Thus, even an accurate assessment of market value 
“does not leave the owner indifferent between sale and condemnation” (Epstein 
1985, 183). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that compensa-
tions are lower than the level that would actually restore the landowner. In Kimball 
Laundry v. United States (338 U.S. 1 [1949]), Justice Frankfurter noted that “the 
value of property springs from subjective needs and attitudes; its value to the owner 
21. The opinion quotes an earlier ruling in United States v. Miller (317 U.S. 369, 374 [1943]), which 
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may therefore differ widely from its value to the taker. . . . In view, however, of the 
liability of all property to condemnation for the common good, loss to the owner of 
nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic 
attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is properly treated 
as part of the burden of common citizenship.” Thus, the laundry owner in Kimball 
could not recover for the dissipation of the “goodwill” he had built up at his location 
because it was not transferred to the state—it was simply destroyed.
Clearly, “the disregard for non-market values . . . creates a systematic downward 
bias in the prices paid in eminent domain proceedings” (Posner 1977, 43). Beyond 
that, the Supreme Court has frequently stated that the fair-market-value standard is 
not “absolute.” In fact, the courts have developed a number of doctrines that allow 
compensation substantially below market value, even lower than the owner actually 
paid for the property, thereby guaranteeing that compensation must be below the 
value that the owner places on the condemned property (United State v. Commodi-
ties Trading Corp. 339 U.S. 121 [1950] and United States v. Fuller 409 U.S. 488 
[1973]), and thus creating incentives for undervaluation by condemning agencies.
Consider Vera Coking’s situation. She had lived in her ocean-front home in 
Atlantic City for almost four decades when, in May 1996, she received notice that 
the Casino Redevelopment Authority had condemned her property. She had ninety 
days to move so that the Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino could use her land to build a 
parking area and put in a lawn. The “fair market value” of her home was appraised to 
be $251,250. However, she had actually turned down a $1,000,000 offer by another 
casino operator in 1983, which suggests that the actual market value was much greater 
than the assessed value but still less than Coking’s personal subjective evaluation. This 
appraisal was quite consistent with other condemnation assessments done in the same 
community: a pawnshop that the owners had purchased recently for $500,000 (an 
obvious indicator of actual market value) was assessed at $174,000, and a neighboring 
restaurant was assessed at $700,000, an amount that would not even cover the legal 
fees and start-up costs for the restaurant owners to relocate. Of course, the victims 
of an undercompensated takings can sue in an effort to overturn the condemnation 
or increase the compensation (and the victims of the Atlantic City condemnations 
just mentioned have done so), but this resort is clearly a costly and time-consuming 
process with considerable risks. Thus, government authorities making the condemna-
tions and assessments have strong incentives to undervalue property, and doing so is 
a common practice (Starkman 2001). In fact, “initial compensation offers by the gov-
ernment often pale in comparison to the market value of the land” (Kulick 2000, 665 
n. 159) or to the value that the victim might ultimately receive through litigation. The 
recent Mississippi case mentioned earlier awarded a landowner $20,000 for his 1.6 
acres seized in order to build a subsidized Nissan plant, or more than twice the state’s 
highest offer of $9,200 (Mississippi Churning 2002). Of course, this landowner prob-
ably had to pay his lawyer approximately 40 percent of the award, so the actual gain 
from litigation was small, illustrating the disincentive associating with such litigation 
and the bargaining power that eminent domain gives to the state.VOLUME X, NUMBER 2, FALL 2005
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Not surprisingly, “once . . . subjective values are ignored [by the courts in set-
ting rules for compensation in eminent domain], then institutionally, government 
behavior will take advantage of the background legal rules. The eminent domain 
power thus allows the state to push hard so that the landowner will take a price which 
is . . . lower than he would have taken in any voluntary exchange” (Epstein 2001, 7). 
Indeed, as a result of the bargaining power that eminent-domain powers and the high 
cost of litigation give to government agencies, “government officials are becoming 
increasingly brazen in invoking eminent domain” to transfer land to private for-profit 
organizations (NCPA 2002, 1), in part because “many owners cave in to the pres-
sure and settle” (Berliner 2002, 1). The prospect (and expected costs) of fighting a 
threatened eminent-domain taking through the courts in an effort to get more money 
than a government official has offered can be sufficiently frightening to induce many 
individuals to accept substantially lower prices than they would otherwise be willing 
to take. Thus, an underevaluation bias exists even for “voluntary” sales of property to 
the government, at least for individuals who do not have sufficient political influence 
to counter such a bargaining-power advantage.
Inefficient Transfers Through Eminent Domain
As the public-use constraint on eminent domain has disappeared, it has become eas-
ier for government to use this power to transfer land to other private entities, thus 
encouraging the use of the process by those with political power to gain wealth trans-
fers—a quest often called “rent seeking” (Kulick 2000, 673–75)— for substantially 
less than they would have to pay through a voluntary purchase. Recall the Poletown 
case, where the city of Detroit paid $200 million dollars for the condemned prop-
erty and improvements to it and then resold it to General Motors for $8 million. Or 
consider the more recent use of compulsory sale to attract a Nissan plant to Missis-
sippi, which included more than $300 million in subsidies and tax breaks along with 
condemnation of the property in question (Mississippi Churning 2002). This sort of 
government action creates excess demand for private-benefit condemnations relative 
to what would be necessary with a strong public-use constraint. Subsidies also give 
the private recipient of the transfer a competitive advantage over others who have not 
obtained similar subsidies, creating incentives for everyone who may want to obtain 
property for a new, expanded, or relocated business to look seriously at the political 
process of condemnation as an alternative to direct bargaining.
Subsidies are often explicit, as in the Poletown example, but even if the recipient 
of a condemned property repays the full amount that the government pays as com-
pensation, he receives an implicit subsidy if the victims of the condemnation (or con-
22. Individuals who have political connections are not likely to suffer such losses. In the empirical study of com-
pulsory sales in Chicago’s urban-renewal program, high-valued parcels (those owned by individuals who prob-
ably had political clout) were systematically paid more than estimated market prices (Munch 1976, 473). This 
problem of discriminatory pricing based on political influence is inevitable given the  flexibility of the assessment 
standards and the ease with which some (but not all) individuals and groups can influence political decisions.THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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demnation threat) are not fully compensated for their subjective losses. In this regard, 
the only empirical study of the use of eminent domain found that low-valued parcels 
(those most likely to belong to individuals with little political influence) systemati-
cally received less than estimated market prices through compulsory sale in Chicago’s 
urban-renewal program (Munch 1976, 473).22 Clearly, such transfers are not effi-
cient in a Pareto sense, and we have no way to know whether they are efficient in a 
Kaldor-Hicks sense. Indeed, as Epstein notes, the undercompensation bias “has the 
unfortunate effect of inviting government initiatives that do not even meet the hypo-
thetical compensation [Kaldor-Hicks] requirement” (2001, 6). Moreover, inefficien-
cies from such transfers go well beyond those implied by undercompensation (Pareto 
inefficiency) or possible net reduction in “social welfare” (Kaldor-Hicks inefficiency) 
arising from the specific transfers of resources through compulsory sale. “The ineq-
uitable treatment, of course, leads to profound allocative distortions: the lower prices 
stipulated by government lead to an excessive level of takings, and thereby alters [sic] 
for the worse the balance between public and private control” (Epstein 2001, 15).
Government Failure: The Costs of Involuntary Transfers
Political wealth transfers reduce wealth—that is, they are inefficient—for at least five 
reasons. First, involuntary transfers, whether through regulations under the police 
powers or through condemnation and reallocation of property, as in Poletown, gen-
erally  produce  deadweight  losses,  a  net  reduction  in  wealth.  For  example,  when 
explicit subsidies such as those in Detroit (Poletown) or implicit subsidies attribut-
able to undervaluation are given, they “[encourage] economic markets to operate in 
an economically inefficient state by lowering the cost for firms to purchase property 
for corporate activities” (Kulick 2000, 662). Standard neoclassical production theory 
implies that a subsidy to a producer in obtaining a particular input, such as land, leads 
to inefficient overuse of the subsidized input relative to other inputs (in the Missis-
sippi-Nissan arrangement mentioned earlier, the Mississippi Supreme Court remarked 
that the state may have taken more land than it needed to carry out the alleged public 
use). These inefficient methods of production mean that less is produced, given the 
true opportunity cost of production, than could be produced for the same expendi-
tures if the prices paid for resources reflected full opportunity costs: society suffers a 
“deadweight loss” because resources are allocated inefficiently.
 Second, as Tullock (1967) explains it, the resources consumed in the process of 
seeking such transfers also have opportunity costs. He emphasizes the striking anal-
ogy between monopoly achieved through regulation or tariffs and transfers achieved 
through legislation and ordinary theft. Thieves use resources, especially their time, 
in order to steal, and potential victims employ resources (to produce locks, alarms, 
private security, and public police) in an effort to deter or prevent theft. Tullock 
points out that precisely the same analysis applies to the political transfer process, or 
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groups expend resources (time spent in organizing interest groups, money spent for 
lobbyists, political campaign contributions to support the election of persons with 
discretionary power to create transfers) in an effort to gain wealth in the form of 
subsidies or artificial rents created by government actions (for example, monopoly 
franchises, licenses, quotas, tariffs), and others expend resources in an effort to ward 
off such transfers. These loss-avoidance costs, arising through litigation as well as 
investments in political information and influence by potential losers in the political 
transfer process, can be considered a third source of costs arising in the involuntary 
transfer. Because resources used in both rent seeking and loss avoidance have oppor-
tunity costs—they can be used to produce new wealth rather than to transfer existing 
wealth—they are “wasted” (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974). Yet individuals and groups 
have incentives to invest time and resources in an effort to gain wealth through the 
political process if they expect positive private net gains. Use of condemnation powers 
to provide subsidized transfers of property from one private entity to another is part 
of this rent-seeking process.
Exit is another option for potential victims, perhaps by moving to an alternative 
political jurisdiction or by hiding economic activity and wealth (for example, moving 
transactions into black markets). Although immobile resources such as land cannot 
be hidden in a gross sense, many attributes of land can be hidden (or destroyed) in 
order to make it less attractive for taking. Thus, rapid development or exploitation 
of land might be attractive if an undercompensated transfer (or regulatory taking) is 
anticipated, perhaps because such development eliminates, or at least raises the cost 
of achieving, alternative and potentially more valuable future uses that make the land 
attractive for seizure. The incentive is to capture whatever benefits from the property 
can be extracted relatively quickly before the property it is taken away or before police 
powers are exercised through zoning or some other regulatory process that attenuates 
use rights. A landholder might develop (create a residential or commercial develop-
ment) or exploit the property (sow plant crops that consume the soil’s nutrients, 
harvest all its trees, or extract minerals) much more quickly than he otherwise would, 
even though greater benefits potentially exist from later development or exploita-
tion. In order to reduce such “exit” actions and induce compliance with discrimina-
tory transfer rules, other rules are likely to be developed, and the rule makers will 
generally have to rely on courts and bureaucracies to implement and enforce those 
rules. Governments across the United States have created or are creating development 
authorities, zoning commissions, growth-management commissions, environmental 
authorities, and other agencies in order to implement controls on land use. Lawyers 
representing landowners, developers, and government authorities are involved in mil-
23. Rules that facilitate voluntary production and exchange (private-property rights, enforceable contracts) 
also require some enforcement costs, of course, but the level of these costs (litigation costs, assessment 
costs, policing costs that arise when individuals attempt to hide their wealth) increases dramatically when 
laws are also imposed in order to generate involuntary wealth transfers.THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
188  ✦  BRUCE L. BENSON
lions of hours of negotiation and litigation, and experts (assessors, scientists, engi-
neers), landowners, and many other parties devote many more hours to dealing with 
control and compliance issues. These implementation, enforcement, and compliance 
costs are a fourth reason why the involuntary wealth-transfer process is inefficient.23
The fifth source of inefficiency may be the most significant. Use of the takings 
power (including police powers and the power of eminent domain) undermines the 
security of private-property rights (Kulick 2000, 663), and insecure private-property 
rights result in “tragedies” like those that arise in a common pool: rapid use and 
undermaintenance of resources relative to the efficient level of conservation.24 The 
more frequent and arbitrary transfers are expected to be, the more significant these 
costs become. The trends in the use or threatened use of eminent domain discussed 
earlier suggest that this power is being used increasingly frequently and arbitrarily 
in the United States. Although by themselves perhaps these actions may not have a 
tremendous impact on the security of property rights, in the context of overall trends 
24. When a number of people have free access to a resource (a pasture to graze their cattle, a fishery, an 
urban highway), each individual has an incentive to use up as much of the resource as possible before other 
users do the same. Therefore, the commons becomes crowded (with cattle or fishermen or cars), and the 
resource (grassland, fish stock, highway) deteriorates in quality as the result of overuse (overgrazing, over-
fishing, traffic congestion). Each user has an incentive to use up the resource because he is not fully liable 
for the cost of doing so. Part of the cost is born by others. None of the users has an incentive to reduce his 
use (the size of his herd, his fishing catch, his highway trips) or to consider other means of maintaining the 
resource (for example, by supplementing the grass with feed grown on one’s private property, by privately 
farming fish, or by car pooling). So all of those with access try to use up the resource before someone else 
does, and the commons deteriorates and is perhaps even destroyed. Contrast this process with the outcome 
under private property (a private pasture, a fish farm, a private road). If an individual owner overuses his 
resource, he bears the full costs of that action. His resource deteriorates in quality and loses its long-run 
productive value. Therefore, the private owner has an incentive to conserve his property so that it can be 
used to generate income or other benefits over a long period. Crowding is not the only consequence of 
free access, however. When a resource is overused, it deteriorates rapidly in quality and is used up inef-
ficiently, so the quality of the output (fatter, healthier cattle, the size of fish, travel time and convenience) 
diminishes rapidly over time. This outcome could be offset with appropriate investments in maintenance 
or improvement (the grass might be fertilized or replanted, a fishery might be restocked, or people might 
car pool), but the individuals with common access to the resource have no incentive to invest in mainte-
nance because they cannot exclude others from benefiting from such an investment (other people’s cattle 
will consume part of the new grass, other fishermen will catch part of the new fish, and other drivers will 
add trips on the highway). Two characteristics of common-pool resources prevent a Pareto solution. First, 
because users do not pay for the use of the resource, they tend to overuse it. The costs of this overuse are 
external to the individual decision makers because such costs are shared with (imposed on) others. Second, 
because others cannot be excluded from benefits of investing in maintenance or improvements that would 
increase the productivity of the resource, these benefits are external to the decision maker, and there is an 
underinvestment in such activities. In essence, the investment in the maintenance of public, common-access 
property generates external benefits. This process has been called the “tragedy of the commons,” a concept 
originally attributed to biologist Garrett Hardin (1968). The classic treatment of the subject in economics 
is by Gordon (1954), but substantial research supports the hypothesis (see Libecap 1984; Johnson and 
Libecap 1982). Also see Benson 1996 for a discussion of the consequences of changes in law that reduce 
the security of property rights and produce results analogous to those in a commons.
25. When property rights are relatively insecure, bargaining is also less likely (Coase 1960). When the inse-
curity arises because of government’s power to take, however, there is an additional reason for expecting 
bargaining to decline. People who can operate effectively in the political arena essentially have potential 
claims on other people’s property. Seeking control of the desired land through political channels is costly, 
of course, but if it is expected to be less costly than direct bargaining and voluntary exchange, the incentive 
to seek involuntary transfers is strong. Thus, individuals who are active in and familiar with the political 
process are likely to choose that arena because the marginal cost of seeking condemnation is very low once 
someone has invested in building political connections and influence, whereas individuals whoVOLUME X, NUMBER 2, FALL 2005
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in government takings (including takings through regulatory actions under the police 
powers), property rights to land in the United States are becoming less secure. In 
much of the rest of the world, where the use of government powers is substantially 
more arbitrary and less likely to produce net benefits for citizens and where under-
compensation is even more likely, property rights appear to be even more insecure.25
Government taking powers clearly have substantial costs. Indeed, as Epstein 
concludes, “The consequences are quite sobering. Whatever the theoretical promise 
of taking property only with compensation, that gain has been nullified in large mea-
sure [if not entirely] by the troubling circumstances of its application” (2001, 18). 
Therefore, we should question any justification for such powers that fails to recognize 
their potential government-failure consequences.
Conclusions
Epstein contends that “the government must establish the legitimacy of its taking in 
order to legitimate its subsequent transfers of the property taken. Otherwise it is little 
better than the thief who attempts to convey good title to a third person” (1993, 
4, emphasis added). Criticism of uses of the eminent-domain power is widespread 
and growing, which suggests that in practice, at least, the legitimacy of this power 
is not being established.26 Nonetheless, even many of the strongest critics of emi-
nent-domain practices do not conclude that this power should be withdrawn from 
the government. Jones writes that “the power of eminent domain is a fundamental 
and necessary attribute of government” (2000, 286), and Epstein contends that “the 
formation and operation of the state, moreover, requires transferring resources from 
private to public use. Yet the power in the state to take for public use arises because 
the state will not obtain the resources needed to cooperate by voluntary donation 
or exchange. . . . [T]hese exchanges do not occur voluntarily and must therefore be 
coerced” (1985, 4). By accepting the theoretical arguments that (1) the government 
must be the provider of certain goods and services, such as roads, and that (2) dif-
ficulties, such as the holdout problem, will prevent the government from obtaining 
the resources, including right-of-way properties, required to produce those goods 
and services, critics can only propose that somehow we must constrain the govern-
ment more tightly in its use of eminent-domain powers. In 1985, Epstein contended, 
“It becomes critical to regulate the terms on which the [involuntary] exchanges take 
are not politically connected are relatively likely to choose direct bargaining. Furthermore, as the level of 
state transfer activity increases, more people will be forced to learn about the political process, so over time 
political takings will tend to replace voluntary exchange. In contrast, increasing the constraints on the state 
and reducing the ease of obtaining forced transfers would lead to the substitution of voluntary exchange for 
political actions. Indeed, the fact that compulsory sale may appear to be necessary to obtain property rights 
under the existing property regime does not mean that it will be necessary with very secure allodial rights.
26. The Institute for Justice has developed the Castle Coalition as a nationwide network of property owners 
and community activists dedicated to the prevention of the use of eminent-domain power in the United 
States for effecting transfers to private parties for private uses. See http://www.castecoalition.org.THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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place” (4); and sixteen years later he was still arguing that although he was “suf-
ficiently skeptical about the practical success of the constitutional program of forced 
exchanges to favor a sharp curtailment of the eminent domain process even when full 
compensations is paid,” because he recognized that “public virtue is a scarce com-
modity,” he favored “a higher level of judicial scrutiny of legislative action to improve 
the odds of securing limited government by constitutional means” (2001, 6 and 33). 
Similarly, Paul (1988, 266), Jones (2000, 305–14), and Kulick (2000, 679–91) pro-
pose much stricter public-use interpretations by courts rather than stronger constitu-
tional constraints that eliminate the government’s power to force involuntary transfers 
of property. Posner is much more circumspect, however, explaining that although it is 
easy to identify ways in which the eminent-domain process clearly could be improved, 
even if such reforms are adopted
the system would be a poor approximation to market transactions . . . and, 
as a practical matter, they are perhaps no more likely to be adopted than 
eminent domain is likely to be limited to the only case in which it is conceiv-
ably warranted on economic grounds: where the need to assemble contigu-
ous parcels creates a holdout problem. Even in that case, the argument for 
eminent domain is hardly conclusive. Shopping-center developers—among 
many other parcel assemblers who do not enjoy eminent domain powers—
manage to overcome holdout problems by devices such as option contracts 
and dummy purchasers. Experiences with these market alternatives to emi-
nent domain must be studied carefully before compulsory purchase can be 
adjudged the superior alternative. (1977, 44, emphasis added)
In light of this suggestion, I have examined in this article “the only case in 
which [compulsory purchase] is conceivably warranted [but] . . . hardly conclusive.” I 
conclude that members of the private sector are willing and able to provide roads if 
they are allowed to do so, especially if they are allowed to earn a profit. Because the 
private sector can overcome the holdout problem more effectively than the govern-
ment can, private provision of roads is likely to be accomplished relatively efficiently 
with no eminent-domain powers whatsoever. Finally, I have considered government 
failure associated with government takings, including eminent domain, in the United 
States. Despite what may be the most effectively constrained constitutional govern-
27. Economics is not the only relevant consideration in regard to appropriate institutions. Some natural-law 
theorists have considered the issue (Stoebuck 1977, 12–13; Paul 1988, 74–77), but not convincingly. As 
Paul suggests, “None of these arguments for the putative right of the state to take property—whether it be 
(1) the inherent attribute of sovereignty claim, or (2) the ‘public good’ contention, or (3) the attempt to 
extract an implied consent to takings from the initial agreement to join civil society—flow inexorably from 
the natural law position. Indeed, the power of eminent domain seems to fit better with a feudal conception 
of property… . In a Lockean [or natural law] theory of property rights, in which property flows not from 
the state but from individual labor, and the state is nothing more than a device for the protection of preex-
isting, individual property, the power of eminent domain is not self-evident” (1988, 77).VOLUME X, NUMBER 2, FALL 2005
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ment in the world, the constraints on takings have been gradually undermined so that 
today the costs of government failure are rising continuously. Therefore, even if some 
roads were to be relatively expensive or not built at all owing to holdout problems, 
the consequences of private provision would probably be much less damaging than 
the present government failure. Granting government the power of eminent domain 
does not appear to be the “superior alternative” from an economic perspective.27 
Some readers may counter that even if the arguments made here are valid, they are 
incomplete because provision of roads is not the only purpose of such powers. Other 
vital government purchases in national defense, environmental and historical preser-
vation, and public health may not be accomplished without such powers. Although 
this claim may be true, Posner suggests that merely making it is not enough: “mar-
ket alternatives to compulsory purchase must be studied carefully before compulsory 
purchase can be adjudged the superior alternative.” Admittedly, I have not taken this 
step here, but my present objectives are much more modest: to demonstrate that the 
holdout problem does not provide a justification for public road provision or even for   
eminent-domain power in order to obtain right-of-way properties for privately pro-
vided roads. In making this more modest point, however, I have raised serious ques-
tions about the presumed legitimacy of eminent-domain powers in general.
Despite Epstein’s contention that legitimization “must” be provided for emi-
nent domain (1993, 4), challenges to the legitimacy of eminent domain collide with 
the reality that governments need respond satisfactorily only to those with political 
power. If the “third persons” who must be convinced of the justification of takings 
and transfers are those with sufficient influence to receive the transfers, then the decla-
ration that the government is no better “than the thief who attempts to convey good 
title to a third person,” though true, is of little consequence.
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